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Abstract
Using Varian's social insurance framework with a piecewise linear two
bracket income tax, where t1 is the tax rate in the lower bracket
and t1 + t2 is the tax rate in the upper bracket, Strawczynski (1998)
claims that optimality requires t
1 < t
2 = 1. This note provides three
comments: First, it shown that the argument that t
2 = 1 does not
necessarily hold. Second, an equally reasonable interpretation of the
result is that t
2 = 0, if an explicit lump sum tax contingent on luck
is allowed. Third, the result also depends crucially on that income
dierences are solely determined by luck, even if the population is
ex ante homogenous. In an example it is shown that then t
2 = 0 is
optimal.
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Strawczynski (1998) employs a two bracket piecewise linear tax schedule to
the Varian (1980) framwork of social insurance. In this framework individuals
have a xed and certain income w in period one and save x to period two,
where income becomes uncertain. The tax system implies that low income
is taxed at the rate t1 and high income at the rate t1 + t2. The dierence
between low and high income is exogenously set so that high income only
depends on luck. The information assumption is that luck is veriable. All
tax revenues are redistributed through a uniform lump sum transfer D. In
contrast to the simulation results of Slemrod et al. (1994), who analysed




I have three comments on this claim: First, Strawczynski's argument
that t
2 = 1 does not hold in general. Second, the claimed result depends on
an ad hoc and only seemingly innocuous restriction of the policy space. If
an explicit lump sum tax D2 contingent on luck is allowed, an assumption
consistent with the informational assumptions, then I argue that an equally
reasonable interpretation of the result is that t
2 = 0. Third, the result also
depends crucially on the formulation of the stochastic mechanism. It will not
hold if income dierences depend on both luck and savings: In an example
I show that 0 = t
2 < t
1 < 1 when a lump sum tax D2 contingent on luck is
available in addition to the uniform transfer D.
The sensitivity test performed by Strawczynski (1998) with respect to the
piecewise linear tax does therefore not change the overall picture reported
by Slemrod et al. (1994), i.e., that marginal tax rates should be decreasing.
Instead, what is shown is that a uniform linear tax complemented with a
lump sum tax on luck is optimal. I will now rst briey review the model
and then in more detail state my comments. A nal section contains my
conclusions.
1A main contribution of Strawczynski, which I will not comment, is to test the sen-
sitivity of Varian's specic assumptions underlying the simulation results. The social
insurance framework is dierent from the classical frawework beacuse savings cannot be
made contingent on states of nature. In the classical model, however, individuals of dif-
ferent productivity types are not restricted to choose the same labour supply. The social
insurance framework is therefore in a sense more akin to the model used by e.g., Eaton and
Rosen (1980) where a representative individual chooses one level of labour supply in the
presence of wage rate uncertainty. Sheshinski (1989) reported a higher optimal marginal
tax rate in the second bracket for the classical model. Slemrod et al. (1994), however,
showed that this claim was false and provided simulations that indicated that decreasing
marginal tax rates are optimal.
1The model
Strawczynski's formulation of the problem is as follows: In period two the
realised income is x + ei, where (e1;e2;e3;e4) = ( 2; 1;1;2) are xed
and equally probable random income shocks, such that 1 < 2 and therefore
E(y) = x. The crucial information assumption is that if the shock 2 is
realised this can be veried by the policy maker. All income is taxed at the
rate t1 but if the state 2 is observed the additional income in this state, i.e.,
2   1, is taxed at an additional rate t2. All tax revenue is redistributed
with the uniform lump sum transfer D, where a balanced budget implies




(1   t1)(x + ei) + D if i = 1;2;3
(1   t1)(x + 2)   t2(2   1) + D otherwise.
(1)
The expected utility of savings x for a given tax system is u(w   x) +
0:25
P4
i=1 u(yi), where u is a strictly concave ex post utility function. In-















i is realised period two income net of taxation given x. The policy
maker chooses the parameters of the tax system so as to maximise the utility
of a representative individual, subject to the budget constraint and given that
the individual chooses (strictly positive) savings so as to maximise utility for














i) s.t. D = t1x
 + 0:25t2(2   1): (3)
First, note that the rst order conditions for an optimal policy (t
1;t
2)











































Equation (4a) is the analogue to the rst order condition for an optimal
linear tax in Varian (1980) and Eaton and Rosen (1980). Since cov(u0;e) < 0
it implies that t > 0. Since (2) implies t
1 < 1 we have that t
1 2 (0;1).




1 for all t2 2 [0;1].
Since y
4 is decreasing and y
i i = 1;2;3 is increasing in t2 an increase in the
additional second bracket tax rate would then be welfare improving in whole
unit interval.
Observe that the marginal tax rate on period one savings is t1 in all states
of nature. However, the statuary marginal tax rate on realised income is t1
in the unlucky states and t1 +t2 in the lucky state. To illustrate this we can
rewrite realised income in the lucky state as
y

4 = (1   t1)(x
 + 1) + (1   t1   t2)(2   1) + D: (5)
Then y
4   y
3 = (1   t1   t2)(2   1)  0 only as long as t2  1   t1, with
strict equality if t2 = 1 t1. Furthermore, for t2 > 1 t1 we have y
4 < y
3 and
at some point an increase in t2 would potentially not be welfare improving;
i.e., (t
1;t
2) > 0. It then remains to be shown that this does not occur for







i 8i = 1;2;3 and the right hand side of (4b) would be positive
and therefore t
2 = 1 would not be optimal.
Hence, with the argument presented so far, the second bracket additional
marginal tax rate may or may not equal unity. What can be shown, however,
is that t
1 +t
2 > 1. For t2 = 1 t






@t2 > 0 by u00 < 0, the unique additional marginal tax rate in the
second bracket must satisfy t
2 > 1   t
1. The total statuary marginal tax
rate on additional realised income in the second bracket is then (in a sense)
larger than 100 per cent; i.e., t
1 + t
2 > 1. Therefore, even if we have not
shown that t
1 < t
2 = 1, optimal tax marginal rates seem to be increasing;
t
1 < 1 < t
1 + t
2. In this model luck should be taxed away, but luck is taxed
at the rate t1 + t2 not t2.
3Comment 2
I shall now show that even this modied result is not robust for a small
enlargement of the policy space that is consistent with the assumption that
luck (2) is veriable. We now allow for dierent lump sum taxes/transfers
for the two brackets so that D2 is the additional lump sum tax paid in the





(1   t1)(x + ei) + D if i = 1;2;3
(1   t1)(x + 2)   t2(2   1) + D   D2 otherwise.
(6)









We focus on the second bracket tax parameters given that t
1 2 (0;1),




























where  is the shadow price of additional tax revenues in the optimal solu-
tion. Since the individual rst order condition implies @x
@t2 = (2   1) @x
@D2
equations (8a) and (8b) are linearly dependent. There will therefore be
innitly many solutions (t
2;D
2), two of which are (t
2 = 0;D
2 > 0) and
(t
2 > 0;D
2 = 0). The optimal tax in the second bracket in Strawczynski
(1998) works as a lump sum tax and can therefore, of course, be replaced
by an explicit lump sum tax. Such a lump sum tax is consistent with the
informational structure.
A more reasonable interpretation of the result is, in my opinion, therefore
to say that the additional second marginal tax rate is equal to zero: The
decision that the individual is making is what amount to save to period 2
and t2 only has a pure income eect on that decision.
Comment 3
Finally, I will show that the results derived in the previous section are not
robust to a small change in the income generating process. I now assume
4that income dierences do not only depend on luck but also on individual
behaviour. Given the tax system of the previous section the result will be
that t
2 = 0.
Therefore, let realised income in period two be xei, where ei i = 1;2;3;4
are random shocks such that ei < ei+1, the expectation of which is assumed
to equal unity. The four states of nature are still equally probable. The tax
system is the same as in the previous section but now the additional income
in the `lucky' state is x(e4   e3).











































Note that the expressions within brackets are the relevant substitutions ef-
fects which are both strictly negative. I now will show that t
2 6= 0 cannot be
part of the optimal solution. Suppose rst that t
1 and t
2 are both strictly
positive (the case where both rates are strictly negative is clearly not optimal
by (9a)). This is consistent with (9a) but contradicted by (9b). Equation




4 (e4   e3) = 0 so that the tax rates have
dierent non{zero signs, but that is on the other hand contradicted by (9a).
Therefore, t
1 and t
2 cannot both be strictly positive. If we on the other
















which together with (9a) evaluated at t
2 = 0 do not generate a similar in-
consistency. Therefore, the use of an additional marginal tax rate is not part
of an optimal solution. Still t
1 2 (0;1).
Conclusion
In my opinion Strawczynski's contribution does not contradict the picture
painted by earlier contributions. However, I do not argue that the optimal
piecewise linear tax system implies decreasing marginal tax rates in either
the classical optimal tax framework or in the social insurance framework.
The results presented here for the insurance model indicate that a linear tax
5in combination with a lump sum tax contingent on luck is is optimal. But
this conclusion depends crucially on the information assumption; i.e., that
luck is veriable.
Other dierences between the classical and the insurance framework that
may aect the results are that (i) the cut{o income dening the two brackets
in the present discussion has been assumed to be xed at an arbitrary income
so that the second bracket only contains one state of nature and (ii) the
additional problem that high performing agents may imitate low performing
agents is not present in the insurance framework.2 Determining the cut{
o income endogenously may be of importance, in particular if luck is not
possible to verify.
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